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**Report Documentation Page** 

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# **Team**

### SEI team members

- Dr. Bill Claycomb (Co-PI)
- Andy Moore (Co-PI)
- Dr. Jason Clark
- Matt Collins
- Dr. Jen Cowley
- Bill Novak
- Dr. Bronwyn Woods

# **Engaged Stakeholders**

- Two engaged USG partners
  - data and piloting

## Collaborators

- CMU-CS (FY14-15)
  - -Prof. Kathleen Carley
  - –Neal Altman (staff)
  - –Jeff Reminga (staff)
  - –Geoff Morgan (student)
  - –Matt Benigni (student)
- UC-Davis (FY15)
  - -Prof. Sean Peisert
  - –Julie B. Ard (student)

# **Project Framing**




**Objective:** Develop scientifically and operationally validated insider threat indicators

- Need: DoD/Gov't agencies, contractors struggling to build mandated Insider Threat Programs, per Executive Order 13587
- Challenges: Attacks are costly but relatively infrequent
  - Malicious and benign behaviors difficult to distinguish

**FY14 Focus:** Dynamic analysis of *social networks* of convicted *spies* BUT Insiders are not top actors – changes in relationships are key

- **Hypothesis:** Over time, insider social networks exhibit weakening of internal connections, AND the strengthening of external connections to adversaries
- Data: ~140 insider espionage incidents from court records, media reports
- Data Analysis method: Measure connection strength over time between insider and family/coworkers/adversaries (ORA toolset)
- Connection strength measures: communication frequency, reciprocity, time spent, volume, affect, truthfulness (in order of ease/integrity of measurement)

# Context for Understanding Insider Behavior \*



# **Preliminary Observations from Incident Data**

## Broadly specified social networks of ~140 insider spies

• Showed increasing reliance on electronic means of illicit transfer/comms

#### Elaborated the time series of two incidents

- John Walker (and Walker spy ring)
- Private Bradley Manning (Wikileaks)

# Hypothesis supported but situation more complex than framed


- Internal connections may weaken or strengthen over time
- Insider starts connecting more individuals over time (betweenness measure)
- Decrease in ratio of internal connections to external connections
- Excluding ring members, networks grow larger but less densely connecting

Gain confidence in significance as we compare findings with baseline


# Increasing betweenness during spy activities – insider starts connecting more individuals

Come to poster session to see detailed results and talk with analysts!


#### **Walker Case**



#### **Manning Case**



# Theory Building: Social Capital Growth/Transfer



\* Adapted from Dudley's "The Dynamic Structure of Social Capital: How Interpersonal Connections Create Communitywide Benefits," 22<sup>nd</sup> Conf. of the System Dynamics Society, 2004.

# New Work with UC-Davis in FY15

Sociotechnical network (STN) = social network + info flow network Key Ideas

- Combine analysis of information flow networks with social network analysis
  - earlier detection with lower false positive rates
- Focus not on insider access rights
  - but movement and trajectory of info flow

# Compare baseline document flows with actuals (Gemini tool)\*

- Identify document (expected) workflows as baseline (up front)
- Compare actual document flows with expected; identify anomalies (real time)
- Requires comparing documents to documents and flows to flows
- Proposed Measures
  - Document Similarity: hashing, plagiarism detection, keyword matching
  - Flow Similarity: graph matching algorithms eg, using GED measures

<sup>\*</sup> Ard, et.al., "Information Behaving Badly," NSPW '13

# **Plans**

## Scientific and Operational Validation

Data Set Method	CERT Incident DB (Open Src)	SEI Emails (Anonymized)	Enron Emails (Public)	Partner Data (Operational)
Insider Social Net Analysis	FY14	FY14/15	FY14/15	FY15
Info Flow Net Analysis	FY15	FY15	FY15	FY15/16

## Theory Building

 Ground System Dynamics Model in insider threat risk measures based on sociotechnical net properties


#### **Transition**

- Developing Special Issue of Journal "Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory" based on Insider Threat ModSim Workshop (7/2014)
- Apply approaches in projects to develop DOD insider threat architectures

# **Publications – Pattern Language as a Transition Vehicle**

Research results will continue to ground insider threat mitigation patterns

- 24 patterns identified, 6 analyzed, with 7 ACM/IEEE papers published
- Threat models published in book: CERT Guide to Insider Threats (2012)
- Pattern-Based Design of Insider Threat Programs: Forthcoming



# **Contact Information Slide Format**

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